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11 Introduction
Since its inception, the U.S. has experienced three episodes in which public expenditure temporarily
increased to very high levels: the Civil War, World War I and World War II. Of interest to
economists, these wars share a set of stylized facts regarding the response of government policy.
First, debt, ination and tax revenue all increased during wartime. Second, the debt response
was large and persistent, more so than any other policy variable. Third, there were large wartime
decits followed by persistent peacetime surpluses. Fourth, depending on the monetary system
in place, once the war ended, prices either returned to pre-war levels or continued to increase to
partially nance the accumulated debt. Fifth, output increased signicantly during wartime.
The classic tax-smoothing model proposed by Barro (1979) rationalizes the large and persistent
increase in debt. However, it fails to explain the contemporaneous increase in taxes, since the
theory dictates that tax distortions should be spread across time and states of world. The same
result obtains in a standard Ramsey (commitment) model of optimal taxation with incomplete
markets|see for example Aiyagari et al. (2002).
If we incorporate monetary policy, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari et al. (1991) and Aruoba
and Chugh (2010), among others, then the tax-smoothing argument generalizes to stabilizing the
nominal interest rate as well. The government uses monetary policy to make debt state-contingent,
eectively completing markets. As a result, we get no persistence in debt and the response goes in
the wrong direction. In addition, ination is too volatile, with zero or negative autocorrelation. The
failure of complete markets models in accounting for the stylized behavior of U.S. policy variables
is addressed more generally by Marcet and Scott (2009).1
As argued in Martin (2009), relaxing the commitment assumption|which brings us back to an
incomplete markets economy|allows standard tax-smoothing models to explain both the mix of
nancing instruments used to pay for temporary increases in expenditure, and the large and per-
sistent response in debt. The analysis, however, does not cover the behavior of decits and output,
leaving some important empirical regularities of wartime nancing unexplored. In addition, the
numerical simulations predict either implausibly low or high levels of ination, and a counterfactual
postwar behavior in tax revenue.
In this paper, I present a theory of government policy that matches qualitative and quantitative
facts of U.S. wartime policy. As in Martin (2009), the key friction is the government's inability to
commit to policy actions beyond the current period. A notable theoretical dierence is that here,
the underlying monetary economy is a variant of the micro-founded framework proposed by Lagos
and Wright (2005), as opposed to the reduced-form approach of cash-in-advance.2 In addition,
the quantitative treatment in this paper is, as far I know, the rst systematic attempt to match a
model of government policy to the combined set of stylized facts of U.S. wartime nancing.
1The policy response in other countries may not conform to the U.S. experience. For example, Aiyagari et al.
(2002) suggest that Lucas and Stokey's model may be better suited to explain French policy in the 18th century.
Similarly, Shin (2007) shows that the complete markets Ramsey allocation can be implemented with active maturity
management in a way that resembles British 18th century policy.
2Monetary theorist have long argued that many key results and interesting insights are missed by adopting a
reduced-form approach|see Wallace (1998, 2001), Shi (2006) and Williamson and Wright (2010), among others.
Furthermore, policy recommendations may be sensitive to the details of the environment and, in this sense, micro-
founded models of money address a version of the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976).
2The mechanism determining government policy works as follows. With limited commitment,
the government still has incentives to smooth distortions intertemporally. However, the gains from
such a policy are weighted against a time-consistency problem created by the interaction between
debt and monetary policy. Specically, how much debt the government inherits aects its monetary
policy since ination reduces the real value of nominal liabilities. In turn, the anticipated response
of future monetary policy aects the current demand for money and bonds, and thereby how
the government today internalizes policy trade-os. Martin (2011a,b) analyze the theoretical and
quantitative properties of this mechanism, in the context of the Lagos-Wright framework.
I evaluate the merits of the proposed theory in explaining U.S. wartime policy in several steps.
First, I calibrate the articial economy to post-war U.S. and show that the policy response to
war-expenditure shocks matches the enumerated stylized facts qualitatively. Second, I simulate
the model for a large number of periods and show that the policy response falls within the ranges
observed in the three war episodes considered. I also show that whether the increase in expenditure
occurs sudden or gradually aects the quantitative policy response. Third, to provide a sharper
evaluation of the quantitative merits of the model, I simulate World War II and directly compare
the modeled response with the data. The model performs well quantitatively, although it over-relies
on tax revenue, as opposed to decit nancing, and predicts a bit too much ination. Finally, I
use the simulation to interpret the abnormal policy implemented during the subsequent Korean
War, which was almost entirely nanced with tax revenue. I argue that this episode is consistent
with a tax-smoothing model with limited commitment, as long as we assume that the increase in
government expenditure was perceived as permanent, rather than transitory.
The results in this paper complement empirical studies on U.S. wartime policy, such as Goldin
(1980), Balke and Gordon (1986), Ohanian (1997, 1998) and McGrattan and Ohanian (2010). The
analysis here provides a theoretical explanation for the behavior documented in this literature. It
also provides further support to the hypothesis that limited commitment is a key friction in the
determination of actual government policy. Coupled with the related analyses in Martin (2011a,b),
we now have a theory of government that, within a micro-founded monetary framework, explains
several aspects of policy during normal times, as well as during infrequent but signicant episodes,
such as wars.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes stylized facts of U.S. wartime policy.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model and characterizes government policy. Section 4 conducts
the numerical evaluation. Section 4 concludes.
2 Stylized facts of wartime U.S. policy
Figure 1 displays select policy variables for the U.S. between 1791 and 2010.3 Periods with tem-
porarily high defense outlays due to wars are highlighted (see Appendix A): the War of 1812, the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam
War and the Afghanistan|Iraq wars. Note that for the Vietnam War, only the period 1967-1969
is highlighted since it is during these years that defense expenditure temporarily increases; except
for this brief period, defense expenditure over GDP actually decreased steadily throughout the 60s
3The data is taken from Wallis (2006a), Wallis (2006b), Lindert and Sutch (2006), Johnston and Williamson
(2008), the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Oce of Management and Budget, as described in Martin (2009).
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Note: Periods with temporarily high defense outlays due to wars are highlighted|see Figure 4 in Appendix A. Real GDP per
capita is detrended using a quadratic polynomial (solid line) and an HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (dashed line).
and 70s. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which started in 2001 and 2003, respectively, implied
a modest but steady increase in defense outlays|only about 1:7 percentage points in terms of
GDP by 2010. Most of the increase in total government expenditure in the rst decade of the 21st
century is due to non-defense items.
Let us focus on the three episodes which involved a sizable increase in government expenditure:
the Civil War and the two World Wars. These episodes share several stylized facts, which will guide
the analysis in the paper.
First, all three wars were nanced with contemporaneous increases in debt, tax revenue and
ination. Goldin (1980) estimates that the contribution of debt and seignorage to war nancing was
91% for the Civil War, 76% for World War I and 59% for World War II, with the rest being nanced
with contemporaneous taxes. Other past war episodes have followed a similar pattern (observe, for
example, the policy response during the War of 1812), with the notable exception of the Korean
War, which in contrast, was almost exclusively nanced with contemporaneous taxes|see Ohanian
(1997) and the discussion in Section 4.4.
4Second, the increase in debt is large and persistent. In fact, debt displays the largest and most
persistent response among all policy variables. Recently, Marcet and Scott (2009) and Martin
(2011a) document that the persistence of debt relative to other policy variables is also a property
of the post-war U.S. economy.
Third, corresponding to the behavior of taxes and debt, there is a sharp increase in the primary
decit during wartime, followed by a persistent post-war surplus. Furthermore, tax revenues remain
at high levels longer than expenditure.
Fourth, ination partly nances the temporary increase in expenditure and may also be used
to reduce accumulated debt. Ohanian (1998) identies the recurring pattern of signicant ination
nancing of war expenditure. In episodes preceding World War II, convertibility of the dollar to
gold and/or silver would be suspended during wartime, and prices would return to pre-war levels
afterward. In contrast, the increase in prices during World War II was permanent. Furthermore,
there was a signicant post-war ination (1946-1948) which, according to Ohanian's calculations,
implemented a repudiation of debt equivalent to about 40% of GNP.
Fifth, real GDP increases during wars. While real GDP per capita grew at 1:5% annually
between 1791 and 1929, it grew at 3:3% and 2:5% annually, during the Civil War and World War I,
respectively. Real GDP per capita grew 2:6% annually between 1933 and 2010; during World War
II, growth was 10:3% annual.
Table 1 focuses on the three main wars discussed above and oers an alternative way of analyzing
the government policy response to war-expenditure shocks. For each variable, the table displays the
dierence between the peak value during wartime and the average of the preceding ve years. This
is a measure of the amplitude of policy response and will be used below to evaluate the performance
of the theoretical model.
Table 1: War peak vs 5-year pre-war average
Civil War World War I World War II
Policy variable
Outlays / GDP 0:108 0:208 0:322
Revenue / GDP 0:021 0:048 0:135
Decit / GDP 0:087 0:160 0:252
Debt / GDP 0:258 0:292 0:579
Ination 0:243 0:122 0:097
Detrended real GDP per capita
Linear 0:075 0:060 0:500
Quadratic 0:086 0:057 0:485
HP-lter 0:096 0:071 0:279
HP-lter (Ravn-Uhlig) 0:063 0:058 0:137
Note: For each variable, the table displays peak value during wartime minus the average of the 5 preceding years. The wartime
period includes the year following the end of the war, to capture variables that may peak with a lag.
For GDP per capita, four measures are presented, each corresponding to a dierent detrending
method: linear, quadratic, HP-lter with a the standard smoothing parameter of 100 and HP-
5lter with the smoothing parameter suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) (6:25). Regardless of the
detrending method used, there is a large increase in GDP during wartime. The reason for presenting
multiple measures of GDP growth is that output may display low frequency movements that are
unrelated to a war-episode. This is a special concern during World War II, where the methods dier
signicantly, since they handle the Great Depression in dierent ways. In particular, the HP-lter
with a smoothing parameter of 6:25 interprets a signicant part of GDP growth during World War
II as an ongoing change in trend rather than cycle.
To put some perspective on these numbers, Balke and Gordon (1986) compute a \natural"
series for output and estimate that GNP was 27% above trend at the peak of World War II, in
1944. On the other hand, Ohanian (1997) reports 40% growth in real GNP between 1941 and 1945.
Taking these previous results into consideration, I will henceforth focus on real GDP per capita,
detrended with a quadratic polynomial (since it improves t over linear) and with an HP-lter with
a smoothing parameter of 100.
3 Theoretical framework
This section presents a model of government policy in the presence of expenditure shocks, following
Martin (2011a,b). The underlaying economy is a variant of the micro-founded monetary framework
by Lagos and Wright (2005).
3.1 Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of innitely lived agents and a benevolent government that
supplies a valued public good g.4 To nance its expenditure, the government may use proportional
labor taxes , print at money at rate  and issue one-period nominal bonds, which are redeemable
in at money. Agents derive utility from the public good according to  v(g), where v is twice
continuously dierentiable, satises Inada conditions, vg > 0 > vgg and   is a random variable
following a Markov process. Let 	 be the (compact) set of all possible realizations of   and use
E[: j  ] to denote the conditional expectation of future variables given the current state  . When
conducting the numerical evaluation of the theory,   will be typically low and stable, denoting
\peacetime", and \wars" will be interpreted as consecutive periods where   is temporarily high.
Each period, two competitive markets open in sequence: a \day" and a \night" market. At
the beginning of the period, agents receive an idiosyncratic shock that determines their role in
the day market. With probability  2 (0;1) an agent wants to consume but cannot produce the
(perishable) day-good, x, while with probability 1    an agent can produce but does not want
consume. A consumer derives utility u(x), where u is twice continuously dierentiable, satises
Inada conditions and ux > 0 > uxx. A producer incurs in utility cost x, with  > 0.5 Agents lack
commitment and are anonymous, in the sense that their trading histories are unobservable. Thus,
credit transactions between agents are not possible. Since there is a lack of double coincidence of
4The assumption that g is valued is made for analytical convenience. We can conduct the same type of analysis
using exogenous expenditure.
5The disutility from producing in the day can be generally written as a convex function of x. A linear specication
reduces the number of parameters that we need to calibrate.
6wants problem, some medium of exchange is essential for trade to occur|see Kocherlakota (1998),
Wallace (2001) and Shi (2006), among others.
There exist nancial institutions (\banks") endowed with a technology that allows them to
record nancial (but not trade) histories at zero cost, as in Berentsen et al. (2007).6 Banks cannot
issue their own notes, nor can they provide third-party verication for government bonds in trans-
actions between agents. At the beginning of each day, sellers can deposit their money holdings at
banks, and buyers can borrow money from banks. Deposits d and loans l mature at night. Perfect
competition in the banking sector implies that the deposit and loan interest rates are equal. Let
i  0 be the bank nominal interest rate. Assume perfect enforcement and no borrowing constraints
in nancial markets.
At night, all agents can produce and consume a (perishable) night-good, c. The production
technology is assumed to be linear in hours worked, n. Utility from consumption is given by U(c),
where U is twice continuously dierentiable, satises Inada conditions and Uc > 0 > Ucc. Disutility
from labor is given by n, where n is hours worked and  > 0. Assume the following regularity
condition holds: Uccc   (Uc   )(1 + Ucccc
Ucc ) < 0 for all c 2 (0;^ c]|note that the typically adopted
U(c) = c1 
1  , with  > 0, satises this requirement.
The rst-best state-contingent allocation is given by f^ x;^ c; ^ g( )g, where ux(^ x) = , Uc(^ c) = 
and  vg(^ g( )) = , for all   2 	.
The government only actively participates in the night-market, i.e., taxes are levied on hours
worked at night and open market operations are conducted in the night market. As in Aruoba
and Chugh (2010), Berentsen and Waller (2008) and Martin (2011b), public bonds are book-entries
in the government's record. Since bonds are not physical objects and the government does not
participate in the day market (i.e., cannot intermediate or provide third-party verication, which
also prevents banks from intermediating debt), bonds are not used as a medium of exchange in the
day market and thus, at money is essential.
All nominal variables|except for bond prices|are normalized by the aggregate money stock.
Thus, today's aggregate money supply is equal to 1 and tomorrow's is 1 + . The government
budget constraint is
1 + B + pg = pn + (1 + )(1 + qB0); (1)
where B is the current aggregate bond-money ratio, p is the|normalized|market price of night
output, n is labor and q is the discount price of a one-period bond that earns a unit of at money.
\Primes" denote variables evaluated in the following period. Thus, B0 is tomorrow's aggregate
bond-money ratio.
The government lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices and announces policy
fB0;;;gg at the beginning of each period, after observing the level of inherited debt, B and the
contemporaneous realization of  , but before the agents' idiosyncratic day-shock is realized. Let
  2 [ 1;  B] be the set of possible debt levels, where  B is large enough so that it does not constraint
government behavior. Proposition 1 below shows that the lower bound on   is not restrictive either.
6Alternatively, we could assume that this type of nancial institutions do not exist and/or that the day market
is decentralized and subject to trading frictions. Martin (2011a) shows that all these alternative variants of the
Lagos-Wright framework display very similar|both qualitative and quantitative|government policy response to
expenditure shocks. The particular variant adopted here has the advantage eliminating the quantitative role of  and
simplifying some analytics.
73.2 Monetary equilibrium
An agent starts the period with|normalized|money balances m and government bonds b. The
ex-ante value for an agent that enters the day market is V (m;b;B; ) = V c(m;b;B; ) + (1  
)V p(m;b;B; ), where fB; g is the aggregate state, and V c and V p are the values of being
a consumer and a producer in the day market, respectively. Since bonds and bank claims are
redeemed in at money at par, the composition of an agent's nominal portfolio at the beginning of
the night is irrelevant. Note that bank claims at the beginning of the night market may be positive
(deposits) or negative (loans) and include the accrued interest. Let W(z;B; ) be the value for an
agent that starts the night market with z net nominal assets. To simplify exposition, let us omit
the dependence of prices and policy variables from aggregate state variables.
The problem of a consumer in the day is
V c(m;b;B; ) = max
x; l
u(x) + W(m + b   ~ px   il;B; ):
subject to m+l   ~ px  0, where ~ p is the normalized price of the day-good. Let  be an individual
producer's output of the day-good. The problem of a producer is
V p(m;b;B; ) = max
; d
  + W(m + b + ~ p + id;B; )
subject to m   d  0. In equilibrium, producers deposit all their money holdings (without loss of
generality if i = 0). In turn, consumers borrow these funds to supplement their own balances.
The problem of an agent at night is
W(z;B; ) = max
c;n;m0;b0 U(c)   n +  v(g) + E[V (m0;b0;B0; 0) j  ]:
subject to pc + (1 + )(m0 + qb0) = p(1   )n + z.
The derivation of a monetary equilibrium in this economy is standard, so the details are relegated
to Appendix B. A key result in the Lagos-Wright framework is that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
all agents exit the night market with the same money and bond balances, i.e., m0 = 1 and b0 = B0.
The resource constraint in the day, x = (1 ) and night, c+g = n, can be used to remove  and
n from the problem. Equilibrium in the day market implies d = 1, l =
1 
 , ~ p = 1
x and i = ux
  1.
The literature on optimal policy typically applies what is known as the primal approach, which
consists of using the rst-order conditions of the agent's problem to substitute prices and policy
instruments for allocations in the government budget constraint. Following this approach, the
problem of a government with limited commitment can be written in terms of choosing debt and
allocations. Given (6) we need to obtain expressions for , , p and q. In a monetary equilibrium:
 =
E[u0
xx0 j  ]
x
  1 (2)









E[x0 j  ]
E[u0
xx0 j  ]
: (5)
8Additional expressions which are useful for building intuition are the marginal values of money and
bonds in equilibrium: Vm = Uxx, Vb = x and Wz = x.
There is a one more restriction on the equilibrium conditions, x(ux  )  0, which comes from
the requirement that the Lagrange multiplier associated with the day-consumer's budget constraint
be non-negative. This requirement can also be expressed as Vm   Wz  0, which implies that for
money to be valued in equilibrium, it has to provide liquidity services in the day market. Specically,
money allows consumers to buy day-output. Note that since this restriction is satised in every
period and for all states, it implies from (5) that q  1, i.e., the nominal interest rate|dened as
1
q   1|cannot be negative in a monetary equilibrium. As shown below, this restrictions does not
bind for any B 2  ;  2 	.
3.3 Problem of the government
Using conditions (2)|(5), the government budget constraint (1) becomes
(Uc   )c   g + E[x0(u0
x   ) j  ] + E[x0 j  ](1 + B0)   x(1 + B) = 0: (6)
Note that x0 is implemented by the government tomorrow, depending on the inherited level of debt
and the realization of the aggregate shock. Thus, let x0  X(B0; 0), where X(B; ) is the policy
that the current government anticipates will be followed in the future.
Although the problem of the government will be written in terms of debt and allocations,
there is a correspondence between policy variables and allocations. From (2), for a given B0 and
x0  X(B0; 0), a higher  implies a lower x. In other words, given current debt policy and future
monetary policy, the allocation of the day-good is a function of current monetary policy. Thus, we
can interchangeably refer to variations in the day-good allocation and variations in current monetary
policy. Similarly, from (3) a higher tax rate  is equivalent to lower night-good consumption, c.
Given aggregate state (B; ) and anticipating that future governments will implement X(B; ),
the problem of the current government is
V(B; ) = max
B0;x;c;g
(u(x)   x) + U(c)   (c + g) +  v(g) + E[V(B0; 0) j  ]
subject to (6) and ux     0.7 Government policy in equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1 A Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium is a set of functions fB;X;C;G;Vg :  	 !
   R3
+  R, such that for all B 2   and all   2 	:
fB(B; );X(B; );C(B; );G(B; )g = argmax
B0;x;c;g
(u(x)   x) + U(c)   (c + g) +  v(g) + E[V(B0; 0) j  ]
subject to (6) and ux     0; and
V(B; ) = (u(X(B; )) X(B; ))+U(C(B; )) (C(B; )+G(B; ))+ v(G(B; ))+E[V(B(B; ); 0) j  ]
7Note that in the government's objective, we simplify the expected day-utility, u(x)   (1   ) by using the
day-market clearing condition, x = (1   ).
93.4 Characterization
Assume the policy function X(B; ) followed by future governments is dierentiable with respect
to debt.8 Let  and  be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the government budget and
non-negativity constraints, respectively. Using VB = x, the rst-order conditions imply
E

x0(   0) + X 0
B(u0
xxx0 + u0
x + B0) j  

= 0 (7)
ux      (1 + B) + uxx = 0 (8)
Uc    + (Uc + Uccc   ) = 0 (9)
  +  vg    = 0: (10)
The following statement establishes some important properties of the equilibrium and is an
extension of the ndings in Martin (2011a,b) to an economy with aggregate uncertainty. See proof
in Appendix C.
Proposition 1 In a MPME, for all B 2  ;  2 	: (i)  > 0; (ii)  = 0; (iii) XB < 0; and (iv)
B0 >  1 and q < 1.
Part (i) states that the government budget constraint always binds. Given the incentives to
smooth distortions over time, the government will not implement the rst-best allocation in the
current period if there are expected distortions in the future. In order to eliminate policy distortions,
the government would need to: contract the money supply at the discount rate; impose zero taxes;
and provide the state-contingent rst-best level of expenditure. In principle, there are two ways it
could achieve this. First, the government could start with sucient claims on the private sector
to implement the rst-best. The amount of negative debt that is necessary to apply this policy is
well outside of  . A second possibility is that the government implements the rst-best allocation
by continually rolling over the debt. This policy is inconsistent with equilibrium, as shown in the
proof|see Appendix C. Given  > 0 it follows, from (3) and (9), that  > 0, i.e., tax rates are
always positive, for all levels of debt and all expenditure states. Similarly, from (10) the public
good provision is always below the ecient level.
Proposition 1(ii) veries that the non-negativity constraint ux   0 does not bind and hence,
can be omitted from the characterization of the government's problem.
Proposition 1(iii) rules out the possibility that the day-good allocation could be (weakly) increas-
ing in debt. This would be inconsistent with an equilibrium since it would imply the government
could increase debt and welfare at the same time, which in turn would mean it is not constrained
by a budgetary restriction. Except at B =  1, the day-good allocation is always inecient: for all
  2 	, X( 1; ) = ^ x and X(B; ) < ^ x for all B >  1.
Finally, Proposition 1(iv) oers two important results. First, 1 + B(B; ) > 0, which means
the government always chooses to carry-over strictly positive net nominal liabilities (money plus
bonds). Second, the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rate (q = 1) is not implemented in
equilibrium, for any level of debt and any expenditure state.
8This is a renement that rules out equilibria where discontinuities in policy are not rooted in the environment
fundamentals, but are rather an artifact of the innite horizon. For an analysis and discussion of non-dierentiable
Markov-perfect equilibria see Krusell and Smith (2003) and Martin (2009). See also Martin (2011b) for further
discussion in a similar context.
103.5 Determination of government policy
The derivative of the equilibrium function X(B; ) in the government's rst-order condition (7),
reects a time-consistency problem, as the government tomorrow will not internalize how its policy
aected current actions. In equilibrium, government policy results from the interaction between
monetary policy and government debt. This interaction introduces both intratemporal and in-
tertemporal trade-os.
First, the government has an incentive to inate away its nominal liabilities, at the cost of
distorting the allocation of the day-good. From (8), given 1 + B  0, an increase in beginning-of-
period debt, B, implies a decrease in day-good consumption, x. In other words, the incentive to
use ination increases with the level of debt and thus, XB < 0. This is the channel through which
debt aects monetary policy.
Second, the government faces an intertemporal trade-o, as stated in (7). The term E[x0(  
0) j  ] is the standard trade-o between current and future distortions, and is the basis for the
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B > 0. This means that if the government increases the debt today, there is an increase in
tomorrow's marginal value of money. I.e., agents tomorrow, facing higher ination due to higher
debt, would have preferred to have arrived with more money. Thus, the current demand for money




B < 0 since
increasing the debt today implies higher future ination, which reduces the current demand for
bonds. In other words, the interest rate paid on debt increases, which tightens the government
budget constraint. For low levels of debt, the former eect dominates, providing an incentive to
increase the debt, whereas for large levels of debt the latter eect dominates, providing an incentive
to decrease debt. The gains from these incentives are oset by the losses due to lower intertemporal
distortion smoothing, i.e., a larger wedge    0.
From (10) we get  =
 vg
   1 and thus,
E

x0( vg    0v0
g) + ( vg   )X 0
B(u0
x + u0
xxx0 + B0) j  

= 0 (11)
(ux   )   ( vg   )(1 + B) = 0 (12)
 vg(Uc   ) + ( vg   )Uccc = 0: (13)
Denition 2 A MPME is characterized by a set of functions fB(B; ), X(B; ), C(B; ), G(B; )g :
   	 !    R3
+ that solve (6), (11), (12) and (13) for all B 2   and   2 	.
114 Numerical Evaluation
This section evaluates how the theoretical model presented above helps explain the qualitative and
quantitative facts of U.S. wartime policy, as described in Section 2. The analysis proceeds in several
steps. First, the model is calibrated to match long-run averages of the post-war U.S. economy.
Second, the model is simulated with war episodes to evaluate the qualitative and quantitative facts
previously described. Third, the calibration is modied slightly to account for the pre-World War
II state of the economy and a World War II-like episode is simulated. The simulated model is then
compared with the actual behavior of U.S. policy during World War II. Finally, the model is used
to interpret the atypical policy implemented in response to the Korean War.
4.1 Calibration








This preference specication implies that both the money growth rate and tax revenue over GDP
are increasing in debt, whereas expenditure over GDP is relatively at|see Figure 5 in Appendix
D. It follows that the primary decit (expenditure minus tax revenue) is decreasing in debt, which
is a feature of the U.S. data, as documented by Bohn (1998). A decreasing primary decit justies
separable preferences in day and night goods, which is a natural assumption in the Lagos-Wright
framework.9
The approach follows Martin (2011a), which calibrates several variants of the Lagos-Wright
framework. That paper shows that the model and calibration adopted here does a good job at
replicating the time-series properties of policy variables in post-war U.S., when including both ex-
penditure and productivity shocks. In addition, the model can account for non-targeted properties
of the data, such as the persistence of policy variables, the money demand function (i.e., the rela-
tionship between the nominal interest rate and velocity of circulation) and the Phillips curve (i.e.,
the relationship between output and ination).10 A relevant result is that, when only considering
expenditure shocks, as we do here, it does not matter whether we abstract from nancial institu-
tions or consider trading frictions. Performance dierences across model variants stem from the
response to productivity shocks.
9Indeed, as shown in Martin (2009) in the context of a cash-credit good model, if we assume non-separable utility
between the two private goods, then these need to be (strong) complements to match observed debt over GDP.
However, this implies tax revenue is decreasing in debt and thus, primary decit is increasing rather than decreasing
in debt. A related outcome is a steep money growth rate function (since revenue increases with debt, ination is
needed to nance the higher nancial burden), which implies unrealistically high ination in response to expenditure
shocks.
10If we run money demand and Phillips curve regressions using the simulated data described in the following
section, the estimated relationships between variables remain close to the data. Details are available upon request.
12Target statistics are taken from 1962-2006 averages for the U.S. economy. Period length is set
to a year. Government in the model corresponds to the federal government. The calibration targets
are: debt over GDP, annual ination, interest payment over GDP, outlays (excluding interest) over
GDP and revenues over GDP. Ination is measured from the CPI, while the rest of the variables
are taken from the Congressional Budget Oce. Government debt is dened as debt held by the
public, excluding holdings by the Federal Reserve system.
In the model, target statistics are derived from the non-stochastic steady state. Since XB < 0
from Proposition 1, if   is constant then (11) becomes u
x + u
xxx + B = 0. Given the adopted




A steady state is an allocation fB;x;c;gg satisfying (6), (12), (13) and (14), given a constant
value for  .
For debt over GDP use
B(1+)
Y  , where Y  is steady state nominal GDP normalized by the
aggregate money stock (and equal to velocity of circulation by the \equation of exchange"); note
the use of B(1+) instead of just B since debt is measured at the end of the period in the data.
We have Y  = ~ px +p(c +g) = 1+p(c +g). Let  be steady state annual ination, which
is equal to . Interest payments over GDP are dened as
B(1+)(1 q)
Y  . Given that debt over
GDP is already targeted, this implies a target for the nominal interest rate i, where i = 1
q   1.
Interest payments are 2:1% of GDP in the data, which implies a target nominal interest rate of 7:3%




Y  , respectively. Table 2 displays the
target statistics.11
Table 2: Target statistics
B(1+)




0:308 0:044 0:073 0:182 0:182
Table 3 displays the parameters that match the calibration targets. The values for   is nor-
malized to 1 and the value of  is set arbitrarily to 0:5. This leaves 5 parameters for 5 calibration
targets. Appendix E shows that expanding the number of parameters available for calibration does
not alter the results in any signicant way.
4.2 Policy response to wars
This section evaluates the response of government policy to war-expenditure shocks. In order
to solve the model numerically, let us discretize the expenditure state. Let 	 = f 1;:::; Ng
11Note that due to the presence of nancial intermediaries, the relative size of the day-market is larger than in
calibrations without banks. For example, adopting a similar calibration approach in an environment without nancial
intermediaries implies output in the day-market is 9% of total GDP, which is standard. Here, this fraction is 18%.
The dierence comes from the fact that the demand for goods in the day-market is larger when there is nancial
intermediation, since money held by producers is not sitting idly and is instead being borrowed by consumers to
purchase day-goods. As mentioned above, abstracting from nancial intermediaries does not alter the policy response
of the government to expenditure shocks. See Martin (2011a) for further analysis.
13Table 3: Benchmark calibration
    
4:1722 0:9728 8:1879 2:5084 4:8290
Note:   = 1:0 and  = 0:5.
for N  2, 0 <  1 < ::: <  N, and let ( i j  j) = Prob( 0 =  i j   =  j). The model
is solved globally, using the method described in Appendix D. The numerical approximation
provides equilibrium functions fBi(B);X i(B);Ci(B);Gi(B)gN
i=1, from which the state-contingent
policy variables can be constructed.
The conditional probabilities of war and peace are problematic to measure since we only observe
realized outcomes in a small sample. One way to proceed is to take the frequency and duration
of wars in the data, and use this information to construct the transition matrix. I take the values
used in Martin (2009), which imply an unconditional probability of 9% for war, with an average
duration of 4:5 years. Consistent with these targets, let P = 0:9775 be the probability of remaining
in peacetime next period and W = 0:7778 the probability that a current war continues next
period. In the exercises that follow, I will restrict myself to only using these two parameters when
constructing transition matrices.
Since the economy was calibrated to the period 1962-2006, with public expenditure at 18%
of GDP, it seems appropriate to use the levels of expenditure observed during World War II to
simulate war episodes. Consider two alternative simulations. First, an economy with only two
states, \peace" and \war". Thus, let 	 = f L = 1; H = 2g, which implies wartime expenditure of
about 31% of GDP, roughly the average during War World II. The transition probabilities consistent
with the targets mentioned above are: ( L j  L) = P; ( H j  L) = 1   P; ( H j  H) = W;
and ( L j  H) = 1   W.
Second, suppose expenditure increases gradually, rather than abruptly, which is a more realistic
depiction of war episodes. For example, during World War II, federal outlays over GDP rst
climbed from an average of 8% to about 21% in 1942, then stayed at roughly 40% for three years,
came down to 23% in 1946 and nally settled around 12% until the start of the Korean War.
To match this behavior, let 	 = f L = 1; M = 1:25; H = 3g. This parameterization implies
wartime expenditure of about 22% and 40% of GDP, depending on the state. Treating the two war-
expenditure states symmetrically implies the following transition probabilities: ( L j  L) = P;
( M j  L) = ( H j  L) = (1 P)=2; ( M; M) = ( H; H) = ( H j  M) = ( M j  H) =
W=2; and ( L j  M) = ( L j  H) = 1   W.
Let us rst focus on the qualitative response of policy to a war expenditure shock. Figure
2 shows the simulated policy response to a 5-period war, for both cases described above. The
economy is assumed to be in the low expenditure state (peacetime) for 100 periods, after having
started at the non-stochastic steady state, B. In period \1" the economy is hit by a war shock
which lasts for 5 periods (like World War II) and then goes back to peacetime for the remaining
periods. For the two-state case, we have  H from periods \1" to \5"; for the three state case, we
have  M for periods \1" and \5", and  H for periods \2", \3" and \4". The series for real GDP is
normalized by the corresponding long-run value during peacetime, so that it is equal to zero right
14before the war shock is realized.
In the periods leading up to the war shock, debt over GDP and ination are considerably lower
than in the calibrated non-stochastic steady state. The reason for this is that, in the stochastic
economy, the government has less incentives to build up debt during peacetime since it expects to
issue a signicant amount during wartime.12 In other words, the lower peacetime debt|relative
to an economy with no uncertainty|is a direct consequence of distortion smoothing. The lower
ination is related to the lower debt, since there is less to service.
As we can see in Figure 2, the model qualitatively matches all the ve stylized facts enumerated
in Section 2, regardless of whether we use two or three expenditure states. First, the government
uses a mix of contemporaneous instruments to nance the war. Second, the increase in debt is large
and persistent, more so than any other policy variable. These two results extend the ndings in
Martin (2009) to the Lagos-Wright framework. Third, there is a signicant increase in the primary
decit, followed by a persistent post-war surplus. As in the data, tax revenue remains higher than
pre-war levels for a longer period than expenditure. Fourth, ination increases during wartime
to nance expenditure and in the post-war period helps reduce the burden of accumulated debt.
Fifth, there is a signicant increase in real GDP during the war.
Although the money growth rate is single-peaked, ination is saw-shaped. Specically, both
simulated ination series register a sharp dip in the rst post-war year. What happens is that, as
the economy reverts back to peacetime expenditure levels, the lower money growth and tax rates
imply an increase in private (day and night) consumption. These eects signicantly increase the
demand for money, which puts a temporary brake on ination. Immediately after, ination goes
back up since the demand for money is relatively stabilized, while the money growth rate is still
above pre-war levels.
The two simulation approaches|sudden and gradual|dier signicantly in the quantitative
response of policy. Recall that average wartime expenditure is the same in both cases; the dierence
is in how the burden is distributed over time. Figure 2 shows that when the increase in expenditure
is gradual, tax revenue, debt and ination all increase considerably more. Similarly, the response
of the primary decit and GDP is more pronounced in the three expenditure-states case. Note also
that the initial policy response in the gradual case is tamer. These results follow from standard
tax-smoothing arguments. In the gradual case, when the economy initially goes to the medium
expenditure state, the policy response is moderated by the fact that even higher expenditure is
very likely in the immediate future. When the economy arrives at the high expenditure state,
the government relies more heavily on decit nancing, to better smooth distortions over time.
Compared to the sudden case, the highest expenditure level in the gradual case is expected to be
of shorter duration, which motivates the more dramatic response.
The performance of the model is a signicant improvement over Martin (2009). Compared to
the World War II-type shock analyzed in that paper, the behavior of ination and tax revenue
is more empirically plausible here. First, ination does not climb to implausibly high numbers;
second, revenue does not exhibit a sharp post-war slump. In addition, the exercise here addresses
the behavior of the primary decit and output.
Table 4 compares the quantitative performance of the two articial economies. Each is simulated
12This result is quite general. E.g., see Lucas (1986).
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Note: Dashed and solid lines correspond to the calibrations with two and three expenditure states, respectively. Periods with
wartime expenditure are highlighted.
for 10;000;000 periods. The table compares peak value relative to pre-war average, for selected
variables. The rst column in Table 4 summarizes the observed behavior in the three war episodes
considered, as reported in Table 1. The second and third columns report averages and standard
deviations for the two simulations. Note that for the articial economies, the table reports war
episodes that last for at least 2 years and that were preceded by at least 10 years of peace. This
is done to get measures that are comparable to the data. If we were to only include wars that last
for 3 years, then the only average that changes signicantly is the one reported for debt over GDP,
since debt growth is directly tied to the actual duration of a war.
Both simulated economies display statistics within the ranges observed in the data. The econ-
omy with two expenditure states appears to slightly under-predict wartime decit and ination,
whereas the three state economy conforms with the observed range for all variables. In both cases
we can obtain larger responses in debt by ltering out wars of shorter duration. In all, Table 4 shows
that the simulations and corresponding policy responses analyzed here are empirically plausible.
16Table 4: War peak vs 5-year pre-war average|data and simulated models
U.S. Wars Model w/ Model w/
2 States 3 States
Outlays/GDP 0:213 0:133 0:211
(0:107) (0:002) (0:055)
Revenue/GDP 0:081 0:090 0:115
(0:047) (0:018) (0:038)
Decit/GDP 0:166 0:074 0:128
(0:083) (0:001) (0:040)
Debt/GDP 0:388 0:267 0:300
(0:165) (0:094) (0:173)
Ination 0:166 0:095 0:128
(0:067) (0:025) (0:057)
GDP 0:179 0:159 0:275
(0:171) (0:000) (0:075)
Note: For each variable, the table displays peak value during wartime minus the average of the 5 preceding years. The wartime
period includes the year following the end of the war, to capture variables that may peak with a lag. The column \U.S. Wars"
averages the information displayed in Table 1. The gures for GDP include the series detrended with a quadratic polynomial
and with an HP-lter with smoothing parameter equal to 100. Articial economies are run for 10;000;000 periods. Reported
averages for the model correspond to war episodes that last at least 2 years and were preceded by at least 10 years of \peace".
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
4.3 World War II simulation
This section takes the quantitative evaluation of the model one step further by considering its t
to a specic war-episode, World War II. Expenditure before the war and immediately after was
signicantly lower than in the calibrated peacetime. To properly account for these lower levels
without altering the benchmark calibration, let us increase the number of expenditure states to
four. Let 	 = f 0 = 0:5; L = 1; M = 1:25; H = 3g, where  0 targets an expenditure level of
about 10% of GDP. This level is an average of the 5 years preceding the war (8%) and the 5 years
following the war (12%), and also happens to be the level in 1941, right before defense expenditure
for World War II began.
I continue using the same two basic parameters, P and W. The only issue now is how to assign
them across the transition matrix. I assume the following. If the economy is in  0, then going to
 L will be as likely as going to any war-expenditure level. Once in  L, the expenditure state is
perceived as the new \peace" level, and going back to  0 is as likely as going to any of the war states.
If in a war, then going back to  0 is perceived to be as likely as continuing to be at war, whereas
going to  L represents the perceived persistent peacetime expenditure level. The corresponding
probabilities are then: ( 0 j  0) = ( L j  L) = P; ( L j  0) = ( M j  0) = ( H j  0) =
( 0 j  L) = ( M j  L) = ( H j  L) = (1   P)=3; ( M; M) = ( H; H) = ( 0 j  M) =
( H j  M) = ( 0 j  H) = ( M j  H) = W=3; and ( L j  M) = ( L j  H) = 1   W.
The model is solved again, as described in Appendix D. The exercise now is to feed a sequence
of expenditure states that follow the data from 1940 to 1960. Note that this period includes the































































Note: Dashed and solid lines correspond to the data and model, respectively. Years with increased defense expenditure due to
World War II are highlighted. Real GDP per capita in the data is detrended using a quadratic polynomial (dashed line) and
an HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (doted line with diamond markers).
subsequent Korean War, which is discussed in the next section. Initial debt in the simulated pre-
war economy is set so that it converges to the data in 1941, right before the expenditure shock
hits.
Figure 3 displays the response of select policy variables to the increase in expenditure during
World War II. The dashed lines correspond to the data and the solid lines to the simulated model.
Table 5 oers an alternative way of evaluating the model quantitatively, by comparing the wartime
peak with the pre-war average.
As we can see, except for ination, the model accounts well for the policy response in this period,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The government in the model relies more on contemporaneous
tax revenue than in the data. This results in a slower pace of debt accumulation and a lower primary
decit. On closer inspection, these dierences correspond to a higher real interest rate in the model
during wartime.13 Notably, though, the repayment of debt in the model occurs at a rate very
13I thank Marco Bassetto for making this observation.








Note: For each variable, the table displays peak value during wartime minus the average of the 5 preceding years. The wartime
period includes the year following the end of the war, to capture variables that may peak with a lag. GDP in the data averages
the series detrended with a quadratic polynomial and with an HP-lter with smoothing parameter equal to 100.
similar to the data. This last result conrms earlier ndings that models of government policy with
limited commitment accounts quite well for the observed persistence in debt|see Martin (2009)
and Martin (2011a).
Regarding the response of ination, we should not expect any stylized model of policy to per-
form well. During World War II, the government imposed rationing and price controls, aimed
at preventing ination. In fact, even though the model displays higher ination than the data,
monetary aggregates|such as M0 and M1|grew signicantly more in the data than in the model,
albeit with less persistence. Notably, though, the velocity of circulation (nominal output divided
by the money stock) exhibits very dierent behavior in the model and the data. In the model, the
large increase in output during wartime mechanically results in an increased velocity of circulation.
This is a feature of the underlying monetary economy and not of the specic theory of government
policy. In contrast, velocity of circulation in the data shows a decrease during World War II|quite
large in the case of M0 and more modest in the case of M1.
Still, even accounting for repressed ination and measurement issues during wartime, it does
appear that the model would over-predict the (permanent) rise in prices due to a war. For example,
consider the increase in prices from 1941 up to 1947, i.e., between the year before and a year after
the period with high defense expenditure. The annual ination rate was 7:2% if we use the CPI
and 9:3% if we use PPI (as many of the empirical studies cited here have done). The model reports
an annual ination rate of 14:3%, which is signicantly higher than either measure|see Table 6.
Table 6: Ination during World War II|annualized rates
CPI PPI Model
1941-1945 0:052 0:050 0:151
1941-1947 0:072 0:093 0:143
Finally, both in the data and the model, output increases substantially during wartime and
returns to trend immediately afterward. For GDP in the data, Figure 3 shows two series: one
detrended with a quadratic polynomial and the other using an HP lter. Table 5 shows that the
19model is consistent with the average of these two estimates. Table 7 displays the GDP growth rate
between 1941 and 1945. The model reports 9:8% annual growth on average, which is in between
the gures obtained from the data without detrending (10:3%) and detrending with a quadratic
polynomial (8:1%). As a reference, Ohanian (1997) reports an average annual rate of 9:6% for GNP
over the same period. The growth rate using the HP lter is signicantly lower, due to the fact
that the lter interprets the Great Depression as a variation in the trend and picks-up the growth
during War World II as part of the upswing that started a few years earlier.
Table 7: Real GDP per capita growth 1941-1945|annualized rates
Detrending method Model
None Quadratic HP-lter
0:103 0:081 0:046 0:098
4.4 The Korean War
As explained by Ohanian (1997) and displayed in Figure 1, the Korean War presents a notable
exception to U.S. wartime nancing. Specically, the war was almost exclusively nanced with
contemporaneous taxes. Ohanian argues that the transitory component of expenditure during
the Korean War was signicant|both expenditure and tax revenue temporarily rise|and points
to President Truman's insistence on a balanced budget policy as a departure from standard tax-
smoothing policy.
The simulated sequence of government expenditure levels, as displayed in Figure 3, includes the
increased government expenditure state that started in 1951. Although it is true that government
expenditure fell immediately after the Korean War, two important observations are in order. First,
the fall-back level of expenditure was signicantly higher than before the Korean War|about 12%
of GDP between 1947 and 1951 vs a bit over 15% between 1955 and 1957. Second, starting in
1958, expenditure hovered between 16% and 17% of GDP, much closer to the average expenditure
during the Korean War (almost 18%) than to the pre-war level.
Under the assumption that, starting with the Korean War, the economy is at a new persistent
expenditure state ( L = 1 instead of  0 = 0:5), the model correctly predicts this episode's peculiar
nancing. As we can see, tax revenue increases and debt continues to decrease. There is a persistent
primary surplus, as in the data. The only notable dierence is the timing of a spike in ination,
which in the model occurs one year after the data.14
Following the initial increase in taxes to nance the increase in expenditure, revenue decreases
slowly, both in the data and the model. In contrast to Ohanian (1997), who views this reduction
as evidence for a temporary component in expenditure during the Korean War, the model explains
the behavior in revenue from the ongoing reduction of the nancial burden, as debt accumulated
during World War II is progressively repaid.
The lesson from this exercise is that the nancing of the Korean War is consistent with a tax-
14This is not visible in Figure 3 since it displays the 5-year moving average of ination.
20smoothing model (with limited commitment), as long as we assume that the increase in government
expenditure was perceived as permanent, rather than transitory. The subsequent history of the
U.S., which has expenditure climbing to an average of 18% of GDP, due to new defense and social
programs, would conform to this perception.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper is a joint test of several working hypothesis for the determination of government policy:
distortion-smoothing; limited commitment; government benevolence; and micro-foundations for the
role of money. It would be interesting to further understand which of these are not necessary to
explain policy during wartime. For example, the degree of government benevolence will probably
not aect the results signicantly, as long as the government is still assumed to care about smoothing
distortions intertemporally and lack the ability to fully commit.
A general lesson from this exercise is that debt accumulation, due to temporary increases in
government expenditure, provides strong incentives for higher ination. This mechanism has a well
articulated theoretical foundation and is empirically relevant, as evidenced by the war episodes
studied in this paper. The economic and political circumstances of recent years have lead to large
increases in debt and the primary decit. Although core ination in the U.S. has hovered around
the implicit target of 2% annual and market-based ination expectations have remained low, there
is an ongoing debate about future ination. Some discussions have focused on whether the policies
implemented by the Federal Reserve will eventually translate into higher prices or not. Little
attention appears to have been placed on the growing incentives to inate provided by an increased
stock of debt. The results in this paper suggest that we should not dismiss such concerns.
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A Periods with high defense expenditure due to wars
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B Derivation of equilibrium conditions (2)|(5)
The problem of an agent at night can be written as





(z   (1 + )(m0 + qb0))
p(1   )
+  v(g) + E[V (m0;b0;B0; 0) j  ]:














b j  ] = 0: (17)
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, we can follow Lagos and Wright (2005) to show that
(16) and (17) imply all agents exit the night market with the same money and bond balances.
Furthermore, the value function W is linear, Wz = 
p(1 ) and thus, W(z;B; ) = W(0;B; ) +
z
p(1 ). We also get
q =
E[V 0
b j  ]
E[V 0
m j  ]
: (18)
A consumer in the day market enters the period with m units of at money and b units of
government bonds. Being generally cash-constrained, he borrows ` units of at money from the
bank with the obligation to repay (1+i)` units of money at night. The consumer then uses m+` to
24buy x goods at price ~ p. Thus, his starting nominal balances at night|net of loan obligations|are
equal to m+b  ~ px i`. Using  as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint,
the problem of a consumer is
V c(m;b;B; ) = max
x;`
u(x) + W(0;B; ) +
(m + b   ~ px   i`)
p(1   )
+ (m + `   ~ px):











Note that i = 0 if and only if  = 0.
A producer has no use for cash and thus, deposits his money holdings at the bank. If he starts
the period with m units of money and b units of government bonds, deposits d units of money and
sells  units of the day-good at price ~ p, his starting nominal balances at night|including deposit
claims|are m + b + ~ p + id. The problem of a producer can be written as
V p(m;b;B; ) = max
;d
  + W(0;B; ) +
(m + b + ~ p + id)
p(1   )
+ d(m   d);
where d is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that states that an agent cannot








The second equation shows that producers deposit all their money holdings if i > 0. Without loss
of generality, assume that they also deposit all their money holdings when i = 0.
The market clearing conditions are ` = (1   )d and (1   )~ p = (1 + `). The rst equation
states that the total amount of money borrowed from banks has to equal the total amount of money
that was deposited at banks. The second equation states that the nominal value of total output
sold by producers has to equal total money holdings|including loans|of buyers. Note that since
producers deposit all their money holdings, d = 1 and thus, ` =
1 
 , which implies (1   )~ p = 1.
Using the day-resource constraint, x = (1   ), we get ~ p = 1
x. Thus, the equilibrium in the day









In addition, in a monetary equilibrium,   0, which implies x(ux   )  0.
Finally, we derive the expressions for Vm and Vb. Given V (m;b;B; )  V c(m;b;B; ) + (1  








and Vb = 
p(1 ). Using the
conditions derived above, we obtain Vm = uxx and Vb = x. Note also that, from (20), Wz = x.
We can now collect the equations characterizing agents' behavior in equilibrium. Conditions (15),
(16), (18) and (20), plus the expressions for Vm and Vb updated one period, yield (2)|(5).
25C Proof of Proposition 1
We will use the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 1  = 0 if and only if f^ x;^ c; ^ g( )g is implemented in all periods, for all   2 	.
Proof. Suppose  = 0. Then, from (8), x = ^ x and  = 0. From (9) and (10), we get c = ^ c and
g = ^ g( ), for all  . From (7), we get 0  (B0; 0) = 0, for all states, which from (8)|(10) implies
x0 = ^ x, c0 = ^ c and g0 = ^ g( 0), for all  0. Suppose now that x = x0 = ^ x, c = c0 = ^ c, g = ^ g( ) and
g0 = ^ g( 0). Then, equations (8)|(10) all imply  = 0.
(i) Suppose not, i.e.,   (B; ) = 0 for some B 2  ;  2 	. Then, (8) becomes (ux   ) +
uxx = 0, which implies X(B; ) = ^ x. From (9) and (10) we get C(B; ) = ^ c and G(B; ) = ^ g( ).
From (6), B(B; ) =
^ g( )
^ x + 1+B
   1 > B. By Lemma 1, the rst-best allocation f^ x;^ c; ^ g( )g is
also implemented in all future periods. Thus, the policy from the current period on is ^  =    1,
^  = 0, ^ q = 1 and ^ p = 
^ x; the value function is V(B; ) = ^ V ( ) 
(u(^ x) ^ x)+U(^ c) ^ c
1  + ^ !( ), where
^ !( )  v(^ g( ))   ^ g( ) + E[^ !( 0) j  ].
A day-market consumer arrives to the night market with nominal balances equal to m+b ~ p^ x il.
In equilibrium, we have m = 1, b = B, ~ p = 1
^ x and i = 0. Thus, the consumer arrives with nominal
balances B  
1 




  (1+^ )(m0+^ qb0)




 . If he does
not deviate, he chooses m0 = 1 and b0 = B(B; ) and hence works ^ nc = ^ c + ^ g( ) +
^ x
 . Thus, the
equilibrium pay-o for a consumer at night is ^ Wc( ) =  ^ x + U(^ c)   (^ c + ^ g( )) + v(^ g( )) +
E[^ V ( 0) j  ].
Consider now a consumer that deviates at night in the following way: he still consumes ^ c
and chooses m0 = 1, but now he sells all his bonds, i.e., b0 = 0 and saves on work accordingly.
After the current period, the agent maintains a portfolio of zero bonds and nances his (rst-
best) consumption with at money, deposits/loans and labor only. Thus, in future periods the
agent works nd = ^ c +
^ x( z)
 . Note that expected nominal balances z are equal to 1 and so,
expected night-labor is ^ c  
^ x(1 )
 . The value of this continuation strategy is then Vd( ) =
(u(^ x) ^ x)+U(^ c) ^ c
1  +^ x+!d( ), where !d( ) = v(^ g( ))+E[!d( 0) j  ]. In the deviation period,
the consumer chooses c = ^ c, m0 = 1 and b0 = 0 and thus, works nc




 . The pay-o
from deviating is Wc
d( ) = U(^ c) ^ c ^ x(  B +
1 
 )+v(^ g( ))+E[Vd( 0) j  ]. A consumer
has an incentive to deviate only if Wc
d( ) > ^ Wc( ).
Canceling common terms, Wc
d( ) > ^ Wc( ) implies ^ x(1+B )+^ g( ) > E[^ V ( 0) Vd( 0) j
 ]. Note that ^ V ( )   Vd( ) = ^ !( )   ^ x   !d( ). We can write ^ !( )   !d( ) = $( ), where
$( )   ^ g( ) + E[$( 0) j  ]. Thus, ^ V ( )   Vd( ) =  ^ x   ^ g( ) + E[$( 0) j  ] and so,
Wc
d( ) > ^ Wc( ) simplies to ^ x(1+B)+^ g( ) > E[$( 0) j  ]. Given $( ) < 0 for all   2 	,
this conditions is satised for all B 2  . Thus, there is a protable deviation from the equilibrium
for any B 2  , a contradiction with (B; ) = 0 for some B 2  ;  2 	.
(ii) Given (1 + B)  0, (8) implies (ux   ) + uxx  0. Suppose (ux   ) + uxx = 0.
Given uxx < 0, the only solution is x = ^ x,  = 0. Suppose now (ux   ) + uxx > 0. Then, the
solution is x < ^ x and  = 0.
26(iii) Suppose not, i.e., XB  0 for some B 2  ;  2 	. Given  = 0, totally dierentiating (8)
with respect to B implies: uxxXB = B(1 + B) + . Given uxx < 0 and XB  0, the left-hand
side of the expression above is weakly negative. Thus, B(1 + B) +   0, which, given  > 0,
cannot be satised for B =  1 and implies B < 0 for B >  1.
From (10), B < 0 implies GB > 0. From (9) and (10) we get F(c;g; )   vg(Uc )+( vg  
)Uccc = 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, dc
dg =  
Fg
Fc. We get Fg =  vgg(Uc    + Uccc) > 0,
since from (9),  > 0 implies Uc    + Uccc < 0. Thus, to show dc
dg > 0 and thus, CB > 0, we need





Uccc   (Uc   )(1 + Ucccc
Ucc )
	
; by assumption, this expression is negative, which implies
CB > 0.
Given the above results, starting the period with a higher B results in: (weakly) higher x since
XB  0; higher c and g since CB > 0 and GB > 0; and a more relaxed budget constraint since
B > 0. This implies the government could increase welfare with an innitesimal increase in debt,
which contradicts VB =  x < 0.
(iv) By (8) and parts (i)|(ii), X( 1; ) = ^ x and X(B; ) < ^ x for all B >  1.
Suppose B(B; ) =  1 for some B 2  ;  2 	. Then (7) becomes ^ x(   E[0 j  ]) +
^ uxx^ xE[X 0
B j  ] = 0. Given parts (i) and (iii),  E[0 j  ] < 0. This last result holds regardless of
whether the solution is interior or a corner.  < E[0 j  ] rules out B =  1; hence, B( 1; ) >  1
for all   2 	. Next, focus on B >  1. For a given   2 	, evaluating (6) today and tomorrow we
get:
(Uc   )c   g   x(1 + B) = 0
(U0
c   )c0   g0 + E[x00(u00
x   ) j  0] + E[x00 j  0](1 + B00) = 0; 8 0 2 	
where B00  B( 1; 0) and x00  X(B00; 00) for all  0; 00 2 	.
Since B >  1, we get (Uc   )c   g > 0. Since B00 >  1 and X(B00; 00) < ^ x we get
(U0
c )c0 g0 < 0. By the argument in part (iii) we know that dc
dg > 0. Also note that (Uc )c is
strictly decreasing in c since from (9),  > 0 implies Uc  +Uccc < 0. Thus, c < c0 and g < g0, for
all  0 2 	. Now, from (9) and (10) we get ~ F(c;)  (Uc   ) + (   )Uccc = 0, where    vg.
Given ~ F = Uc    + Uccc < 0 and ~ Fc = Fc < 0, we get dc
d < 0. Thus,  vg >  0v0
g for all  0 2 	.
From (10) this implies  > E[0 j  ], a contradiction.
Given B(B; ) >  1, X(B0; 0) < ^ x for all  ; 0 2 	; thus, from (5) q < 1.
D Numerical approximation of equilibrium policy functions
The Markov-perfect equilibrium is approximated globally using a projection method as follows:
(i) Dene a grid with 10 points over debt. Create the indexed functions Bi(B), X i(B), Ci(B),
and Gi(B), for i = 1;:::;N. Set an initial guess.
(ii) Construct the following system of equations: for every point in the debt and   grids, evaluate
the four equations characterizing the Markov-perfect equilibrium, as per Denition 2. Note
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that these equations contain policy functions (and their derivatives), evaluated tomorrow.
Use cubic splines to interpolate between debt grid points and calculate the derivatives of
policy functions.
(iii) Use a non-linear equations solver to solve the system in (ii). There are n40 equations. The
unknowns are the values of the policy functions at the grid points. In each step of the solver,
the associated cubic splines need to be updated so that the interpolated evaluations of future
choices are consistent with each new guess.
28Since the Lagos-Wright model has two sectors, we need to construct measures of real GDP and
the aggregate price level. In the model, real GDP is measured using the non-stochastic steady state
as the base period for prices. Thus, let yt = ln(~ pxt + p(ct + gt)) be the measure of log real GDP
in the articial economy. To calculate the ination rate, dene the aggregate (normalized) price
level P as the weighted average of prices in the day and night markets. I.e., for any period t, let
Pt  sD~ pt + sNpt, where sD and sN are the expenditure shares for the day and night markets,
respectively. Expenditure shares are constructed using the non-stochastic steady state statistics as
the base period: sD 
~ px
Y  and sN 
p(c+g)
Y  . The ination rate is dened as: t 
Pt(1+t 1)
Pt 1  1.
Figure 5 displays policy variables for the case with two expenditure states,  l and  H. As we
can see, the relationship between the primary decit and debt|after controlling for expenditure
shocks|is negative, which is consistent with the ndings in Bohn (1998).
E Alternative calibrations and comparative dynamics
The calibration in Section 4.1 could have included more parameters. This section shows that doing











where f(x) is the (convex) production function in the day-market. The benchmark calibration
normalizes & = 1, ' = 1 and % = 1. In addition, we have  = 0:5. Note that we should keep
v(g) = lng since we want expenditure to be \at" in debt, so that variations can be interpreted as
exogenous|see Figure 5.
Consider varying parameter values by 20%, one at a time. I.e., consider setting & = 1:2, ' = 1:2,
% = 1:2 or  = 0:6. Table 8 shows that, except in the case of ', changing one parameter at a time
and re-calibrating implies a change in just one other parameter. Changing & or  aects only ,
while changing % aects only . In contrast, varying ' aects all parameters except for . In all
cases, all calibration targets are matched identically. In addition, velocity of circulation Y  and
the relative size of the day-market, which are not targets, are identical for all calibrations. Table
8 also shows the averages of the 10,000,000 simulations, similar to Table 4, for the case with three
expenditure states. As we can see, the benchmark and all four alternative calibrations are virtually
indistinguishable.
Alternatively, consider changing parameters as above, but without re-calibrating, which gives
an idea of what we could gain in terms of dynamics at the expense of a poorer long-run t. In
all cases, we obtain similar steady state statistics for ination, decit and the nominal interest
rate. Dierences appear in debt over GDP, expenditure over GDP and revenue over GDP. Table 9
summarizes the resulting dynamics, by focusing on war peaks vs pre-war averages, as in Table 4,
again for the case with three expenditure states. Charts similar to Figure 2 for all these cases are
available upon request. Although the changes in parameters are large, there is not much variation
29Table 8: Alternative calibrations
Benchmark & = 1:2 ' = 1:2 % = 1:2  = 0:6
Parameters




 4:8290 4:2792 4:8656 3:5660
War peak vs 5-year pre-war average
Outlays/GDP 0:211 0:211 0:212 0:211 0:211
Revenue/GDP 0:115 0:115 0:115 0:115 0:115
Decit/GDP 0:128 0:128 0:128 0:128 0:128
Debt/GDP 0:300 0:301 0:300 0:301 0:300
Ination 0:128 0:130 0:129 0:128 0:131
GDP 0:275 0:275 0:278 0:275 0:275
Note: Parameters are at benchmark, except where noted. All calibrations match the targets on Table 2.
in the behavior of variables. Notice that variations in the primary decit are almost identical in all
cases.
The largest eect is for the case when ' = 1:2. Here, we get larger increases in revenue and
ination, and a smaller average increase in debt. For revenue and debt, this calibration would
provide a worse t relative to the average performance in the three big U.S. wars. On the other
hand, ination would be closer, but note that this gure is biased upward by the Civil War|see
Table 1. In terms of model performance during World War II, the calibration with ' = 1:2 would
exacerbate the overreliance on revenue and ination, and under-predict the increase in debt (in
addition to failing to match long-run averages). Since the function f(x) needs to be convex, the
assumed linearity in the benchmark calibration is still the best option.
Table 9: Comparative dynamics|War peak vs 5-year pre-war average
Benchmark & = 1:2 ' = 1:2 % = 1:2  = 0:6
Outlays/GDP 0:211 0:210 0:213 0:210 0:208
Revenue/GDP 0:115 0:112 0:124 0:113 0:109
Decit/GDP 0:128 0:128 0:122 0:128 0:129
Debt/GDP 0:300 0:305 0:264 0:300 0:310
Ination 0:128 0:123 0:150 0:126 0:116
GDP 0:275 0:272 0:277 0:272 0:267
Note: All parameters are at benchmark, except as specied on each column. Economies are not re-calibrated.
For the other alternative parameterizations, the dierences are not large enough to matter for
the results and any gains in t would be heavily oset by the worse match in long-run averages.
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